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Most of us find the events of the last five or six years nothing short
of astounding. It is not simply that the Cold War has ended, but that it
ended so fast and with so little resistance. Already it has become diffi-
cult to explain to students in international relations classes the atti-
tudes of authors who wrote just eight or ten years ago. Some of these
students were only starting college or were still in high school when
the Berlin Wall came down, and in the years prior to that, the Soviet
Union had already started its fundamental transformation. l What will
the world be like in ten more years? How will we explain the fears
and foibles of the current generation, let alone those of the generations
preceding us?
Observers in the West have gone through several distinct psychologi-
cal phases in their struggle to adjust to changing world circumstances.
The first reaction was one of euphoria and relief-not so much an
intellectual reaction as emotional. We could hardly believe it when the
East German government simply stopped-almost overnight-its ef-
forts to prevent movement across the border into West Germany, when
protestors danced on the ruins of the old Berlin Wall, and when one
eastern European dictatorship after another fell at the hands of popu-
lar and largely peaceful revolutions. Those who watched will always
remember the elation and excitement that swept across this country
during these events. For those too young to remember, it may never be
possible really to explain the emotional reaction of our country.
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Catherine Anderson, N.Y.U. Law School Class of 1995, for her research assistance.
1. The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989; Germany was reunited in October 1990. Bul-
garia's relatively peaceful revolution occurred in 1990, with free elections being held in June of
that year. In Czechoslovakia, the Communist party fell from power in late November of 1989;
Hungary had declared itself a republic the month before on the 33rd anniversary of the Hun-
garian revolt of October 23, 1956. The Poles elected their first non-communist premier in Au-
gust of 1989. The Romanian revolution was more violent, but nonetheless rapid; in December
of 1989 Ceaucescu was removed from power by a combination of Romanian army units and
civilian protestors. The Soviet Union itself dissolved at the end of 1991, leaving the transition
complete.
119
HeinOnline -- 64 U. Cin. L. Rev. 120 1995-1996
120 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
The second phase was a bit more sedate, but' still enthusiastic. Sud-
denly, we decided that we had "won" the Cold War. Democracy had
won; capitalism had won; and overall, the United States had won. The
Soviet economic and political systems had been proven inferior to our
own. We viewed the United States as a model for the rest of the world.
As one nation after another set up various forms of democratic capital-
ism, we basked in the self-congratulation typical of self-anointed lead-
ers. We were no longer merely the "leaders of the free world"-a
phrase that most liberals had always found enormously uncomfortable,
in part because of its employment by conservatives bent on intervention
in Third World politics-but were rather leaders of the entire world.
Furthermore, we saw ourselves as leaders chosen by the voluntary de-
cisions of people in other countries and by the world press.
In part, this wave of self-congratulation evolved from the role that
we felt we had been selected to fill in international politics. We
thought that our political and economic system became a model and
that our leadership was suddenly unchallenged in world diplomacy.
The United Nations's Security Council was no longer artificially
blocked by Soviet obstructionism; therefore, the way was clear for us to
exercise our "natural" leadership role over other nations. If the first
phase of this changing world order is best exemplified by the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the second phase is best exemplified by the Persian Gulf
War. The United States confidently stepped in to run a world that
overwhelmingly, and we thought appropriately, looked to it for
guidance.
The third phase, unfortunately, is best exemplified by Somalia. The
United States was shocked to find that removing the obstructionism of
the Soviet Union did not make leadership in world politics costless and
trouble free. We now realize that many other sources of resistance to
American domination remain and that while we may, in theory, have
the power to dominate the globe, doing so will typically involve a com-
mitment that we may not be willing to make and a price that we are
unwilling to pay. Perhaps we thought that our having bested the Soviet
Union and Iraq would so impress the Aidids and Karadziks of the
world that they would step in line if we just shook our finger. That
might have been true if those factions had been convinced that we re-
ally meant it. However, given their much greater stake in the local
concerns in which they were involved, we should not have made such
assumptions. At any rate, they were not impressed, and they were
right.
Where do we stand now? Specifically, what is the current psycho-
logical climate? It is always hard to choose one element of a complex
scene as paradigmatic, but we might state the general mood this way:
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the end of the Cold War has made a difference; we are much more
inclined to assume that we can get what we want; but we are also
aware that there will be a cost. Thus, we want to save our resources
and ration our energy so that we spend them only on those things that
matter most to us. The difference between our current frame of mind
and our initial euphoria is that we now realize the price of our endeav-
ors. The difference between our current frame of mind and our enthu-
siasm for the foundation of a new world order is that we are only
willing to incur costs if the benefits will be ours specifically.
This last difference is the focus of this article. I will contrast two
different approaches to the American role in this post-Cold War
world. I will refer to these roles as "public citizen" and "private indi-
vidual." After the Cold War, the United States recognized itself as a
public citizen with certain responsibilities incumbent upon it. These
responsibilities came along with the opportunities for national aggran-
dizement that the end of the Cold War presented. For example, during
the Gulf War, we recognized a role as public citizen, albeit with an
overly optimistic view of what that role entailed. The self-congratula-
tory rhetoric of American foreign policy during that time period was
arrogant and annoying. However, the air of American noblesse oblige
had an element of truth to it. The American role was unique and car-
ried with it unique responsibilities.
When the costs of playing public citizen became apparent, however,
the United States retreated to the role of private individual. The for-
eign policy debate in Washington today is dominated by individuals
who think that the United States is entitled to be as selfish as any other
nation in the world. These individuals believe that we have no general
responsibilities to the world at large. They do not think, however, that
the United States is only as able to get its will as any other nation;
they are happy that this is not the case. Yet, they believe that the
United States is entitled to reserve for itself any benefits that flow from
its ability to dominate world politics. In their world view, the United
States's power to influence world events is a private, not public, good.
The rapidity with which we move from one perception of the Amer-
ican role to the other is surprising. Only a few years have elapsed
between the era of Persian Gulf interventionism and our post-
Somalian isolationism. When leadership seems to suit our selfish na-
tional objectives, we think that other nations should automatically rec-
ognize our status as a world power. When isolationism suits us better,
we reverse our course. The combined effect of this rapid shift from our
role as public citizen to private individual is apparent. We are trying
to reap the benefits that come with our solitary superpower status
without paying a price.
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It is far from clear, as a purely strategic matter, whether it is possi-
ble to have it both ways. A country gains respect from other na-
tions-and thus, the opportunity for leadership-by playing a public
role even when that role is not to that country's advantage. In interna-
tional and domestic politics, others support your actions only because
they have found your leadership acceptable in other cases, and accept-
able means "of benefit to the community at large." Although that is
not the main point of this article, I think that it should be of serious
concern to American policy makers. Leadership potential is like any
other asset: the time will come when the United States will want the
option to lead, and it would be unwise to let the option slip away
because it temporarily is burdensome.
My main point is actually about ethical responsibility itself, the
moral rather than the strategic issue. Those who think that interna-
tional morality is a contradiction .in terms will find much of the follow-
ing argument naive and unrealistic. However, because I have ad-
dressed that position in other articles, I will not make its refutation a
central object here.2 The following discussion is addressed, instead, to
those who are at least open to the idea that ethical notions have some
role in global politics. Most people are open to these considerations
even if their international ethics consist of a rather minimal set of
human rights, sovereignty rights, or the rules of war. I believe that
special powers carry special responsibilities. Specifically, the United
States may have a different set of rights and duties than other nations,
and we must think about what those special duties include. If one be-
lieves that there are potential justifications in certain circumstances for
a special right to lead,s that special right must entail certain
obligations.
There are three parts to the discussion. Part I analyzes the argu-
ment that much of the confusion about America's current role in world
politics stems from the question of whether its role is that of a public
citizen or private individual. Part II argues that, at this point in time,
the role of public citizen is an appropriate one for the United States to
assume. Finally, Part III offers recommendations about how this coun-
try should carry out this role responsibly.
1.
Is the United States like any other country? Are its rights and re-
2. See generally LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL MORALITY IN A
ONE SUPERPOWER WORLD ch. 2 (1994).
3. [d. (advancing this claim).
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sponsibilities the same as other countries? Is the most important nor-
mative principle of the international order the norm of sovereign
equality, or does the normative order recognize legitimate hierarchy?
Are state responsibilities symmetric, in that what one state owes to a
second is necessarily the same as what the second owes to the first? Or,
are there situations where the first owes the second more, or less, than
what the second owes to the first? These are the questions about which
Americans are confused. We might describe one set of answers to these
questions as characteristic of a "public citizen" model of American for-
eign policy and the other as "private individual."
The private individual vision of the American role sees international
affairs as essentially symmetric. No one state has any greater rights or
responsibilities than any other. If A owes something to B, B owes the
identical thing to A whenever, as a factual matter, the tables are
turned. All states are equal; a hierarchy. of states is indefensible
whether the hierarchy results in greater opportunities or greater re-
sponsibilities. No state bears a greater responsibility to further the in-
terests of the system as a whole than any other. No single state bears
public responsibilities.
This seems to be the model put forth by international legal norms.
The United Nations's Charter recites the fundamental principle of the
equality of states. Furthermore, international legal norms, as a general
matter, do not differentiate between more and less powerful states. All
states are equally obliged to respect one another's sovereignty, to ad-
here to treaty obligations, and to respect international human rights.
Regarding international law, the states are interchangeable. Although
states are obliged to adhere to these norms, no one state has a peculiar
responsibility to consider the interests of the world community as a
whole; each is entitled to further its own self-interest within the con-
fines of those norms without accepting any added responsibilities for
the general well-being of other nations.
Aligned against this vision of international politics is the model of
public citizen. According to this view, powerful states-particularly,
the United States-bear special responsibilities to the world commu-
nity. They are expected to exercise their power in the public good.
Concurrent with these special responsibilities are special powers; there
is a right to lead and, in the process of leadership, to do things that are
forbidden to other nations. This vision is distinctly asymmetrical and
hierarchical. In contrast to the traditional international approach of
sovereign equality, this view recognizes that states are not· interchange-
able, but have specific and distinctive roles.
Although hierarchy is not the traditional international legal vision,
there are aspects of international law that cannot be explained in any
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other way. The most unmistakable indication of the public citizen vi-
sion is that a small number of powers have permanent seats, and also a
veto power, on the Security Council. When the United Nations was
established, it was understood that this special prerogative was to be
accompanied by the responsibility to exercise the veto consistently with
the public good and not simply to further the individual power's self-
interest. Other indications of a hierarchical view of world power in-
clude those institutions that function through some form of weighted
voting, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
Some observers of international politics, of course, think that weighted
voting is entirely justifiable, while others disagree. However, justifica-
tion is not the issue right now. What matters now is that, justifiable or
not, the world is not arranged according to a strict principle of sover-
eign equality. The traditional international law vision of a world of
completely equal states is essentially a myth.
Americans have tended to vacillate between recognizing a special
role for their country and insisting that the United States be treated no
differently from any other. It is no surprise that human beings tend to
recognize a special role when that role carries special prerogatives, but
to retreat from it when it would carry additional responsibilities.
Hence, the self-congratulation at the end of the Cold War, when it
seemed that leadership would follow naturally and relatively costlessly
from our "sole superpower" status, was not surprising. Furthermore,
our retreat when other nations have asked for our assis-
tance-regarding the war in the former Yugoslavia, during the finan-
cial crises as Russia started its transition to a market economy, or in
the course of the civil war in Rwanda-was to be expected. It is at
these times that the American public asks, "Why must we always be
the world's policeman?" The question that is rarely, if ever, addressed
is how to reconcile the apparent willingness to assume the mantle of
authority when American interests are at stake and the costs are low,
with our "Why me?" whining when the going gets tough.
The confused American attitude towards international responsibility
is nurtured by the unclarity of our relationship with the United Na-
tions. To a certain degree, the United States has been encouraged by
the existence of the United Nations to act as though that body is the
only forum in which the good of the world community needs to be
considered. By envisioning the United Nations as solely responsible for
issues of world governance, we have lulled ourselves into complacency
regarding our own responsibilities towards the world order. Our con-
fusion starts with an overly literal analogy between domestic govern-
ment and the United Nations. If we think of the United Nations as an
incipient world government, the United States would seem to be one of
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the governed like any other nation-an entity with no greater share of
responsibility than any other subject.
By analogizing the United Nations to an admittedly imperfect world
government, we overlook both the ways that it depends on the great
powers' resources as well as the asymmetries and hierarchies that it
creates. The United Nations, obviously, was the brainchild of the vic-
torious powers in the second World War, particularly the United
States. The conference that led to the establishment of the United Na-
tions took place in the United States; the United Nations's current
headquarters is in the United States; and the United States provides a
substantial portion of the organization's financial support. The Secur-
ity Council, without which the organization can take little effective ac-
tion, is dominated by the United States, which has a permanent seat
and, thus, a veto. In recent cases where the organization has acted
forcefully, it was largely due to American instigation. Conversely,
where the United States has been more willing to look the other way,
substantial threats to international order and international human
rights have gone unchecked.
This is not to say that other powers have not played a role. The
other countries that dominate the United Nations are also great pow-
ers, in part because of their financial clout in the organization, but also
because they have been politically favored-for instance, with perma-
nent Security Council seats. Although committed in theory to the for-
mal sovereign equality of states, the United Nations has never been,
and could never have been, committed to sovereign equality in fact.
First, it is hard to imagine that the organization would ever have been
formed without a small group of committed and powerful states behind
it, supplying the initiative and providing the resources. Second, it is
hard to imagine that the organization could take effective action in in-
ternational problems without powerful states upon which to rely for
financial, military, and logistical support.
The formal institutions of world governance greatly depend on the
resources of the great powers and respond selectively to their interests
and initiatives. The same, however, is true of the less formal institu-
tions of world governance, which international relations specialists re-
fer to as "regimes." Regimes are defined as sets of norms that condi-
tion expectations, and therefore. behavior, in world politics. The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is one example.
Other examples include the Nuclear N~nproliferation Treaty, world
environmental and species conservation agreements, and international
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agreements on the protection of intellectual property.· As with the
United Nations, these regimes seem to reflect the formal equality of
the state actors in the international system. Thus, these regimes en-
courage us to believe that American rights and responsibilities are the
same as those of any other state. However, as with the United Nations,
even a cursory look reveals how these regimes are more indicative of
hierarchy than equality.
By their nature, expectations are intangible and, therefore; hard to
measure. Furthermore, the source of expectations is often correspond-
ingly obscure. However, the inequality of some of these regimes is ap-
parent on their face. The nuclear nonproliferation regime, which al-
lows certain countries to maintain their nuclear weapons indefinitely,
is one example. Furthermore, it should be obvious that no set of infor-
mal norms stands much of a chance of authoritative acceptance if it is
consistently opposed by the powerful states in the system. For years
the developing world promoted the concept of aNew International Ec-
onomic Order. These words are almost never heard today. Whatever
the moral virtue of appealing for international wealth redistribution
and however strongly the developing world may agree and expect that
a higher level of international assistance is in order, it simply will not
occur as a result of their beliefs and expectations. This is not a conse-
quence of any general principle that norms must be approved unani-
mously by all sectors of the international community before they be-
come part and parcel of our global system. The point is not symmetric;
it is entirely possible that norms adhered to and insisted on by stronger
states will take effect eventually against the weaker. That, after all, is
what it means to be weak.
The politics of the international community, in other words, is not
so different from the politics of domestic governance. It is extremely
difficult to secure adoption and enforcement of a set of norms that truly
runs against the grain of vested interests. There is, however, a differ-
ence of degree. In domestic society, at least in any well established and
successfully functioning democratic society, the opportunities are more
substantial for a large number of weaker actors to counterbalance a
small number of powerful ones. There is an established organizational
structure that has appropriated sufficient independent power to be able
to throw weight behind the goals of any segment of society that can
capture it. In a democratic society, the voters can "throw the rascals
out," albeit with a great deal of difficulty; formal mechanisms of demo-
4. Note that although these examples are relatively formalized treaty arrangements, the
word "regimes" also includes informal norms and expectations about state behavior.
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cratic governance exist for doing so. The institutions of international
governance that we currently possess were not created with such inde-
pendent power and have not acquired it in the course of their exis-
tence. Indeed, it was specifically a condition of their creation that they
not present a threat to the sovereignty of the states.
For all these reasons, the United Nations and the international re-
gimes that regulate state conduct present little restraint on the domi-
nance of stronger powers, at least in the short run. 5 To the contrary,
they entrench that dominance. Due both to their formal institutional
structure and to their informal dependence on great power resources,
the existence of such institutions does not import any great levelling of
power inequalities. However, their existence does create an illusion of
equality that encourages the United States to pass the buck when do-
ing so is to its advantage. Because institutions of world governance ex-
ist, it easy for us to retreat to a role of co-equal state when interna-
tional responsibilities seem onerous. We can always "leave it in the
care of the United Nations." Why should America be "the world's
policeman" when that is what the United Nations was designed to do?
A more clearheaded appreciation of our international governance
system would recognize, however, the partnership between the United
States and the United Nations that currently exists. It is a partnership
that places on the United States a significant role as public citizen. The
partnership might be analogized, although imperfectly, to the division
of authority between the executive and the legislature in domestic
politics. The role of the legislature is to make decisions that the execu-
tive will carry out; the executive supplies the muscle, and the legisla-
ture supplies the decision-making capacity. We should not overstate
this division because in any system of domestic governance there is con-
stant pulling and tugging as different branches define their roles. The
executive necessarily exercises independent decision-making power
when it carries out legislative commands, and the legislative ability to
command directly should not be underestimated. The executive in most
systems, moreover, possesses substantial power to initiate or veto legis-
lative action.
An ideal, contemporary role for the powerful nations of the
world-and the United States, in particular-would be to assume the
role of executive officer for the world community at large. The United
States is well positioned to help supply the muscle for decisions that a
relatively more democratic international political system makes. This
does not, in and of itself, solve the issue of the legitimacy of the Ameri-
5. We will return to the question of the long-run implications of such institutions below.
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can .role. Analogizing the United States to a domestic executive does
not deprive it of decision-making power, nor does the analogy relegate
the United States to the status of legislative handmaiden, for the rea-
sons just described. In a true democracy, the executive as well as the
legislature should be electorally responsible precisely because the exec-
utive possesses substantial· independent power. The legitimacy issue
arises because the United States has acquired its disproportionate po-
litical leverage through power and not through democratic means. Per-
haps the best that we can hope for in the near future is something akin
to an unelected monarch working in conjunction with an elected legis-
lature. As I will argue next, there may be reasons for settling with
such a system in the short run.
II.
Observations about disproportionate American power in world polit-
ics are so obvious that they border on the banal. However, their impli-
cations are not as obvious as it might appear. Generally, they have
served as a prelude to some sort of outright condemnation of American
"imperialism," and sometimes this is justified. If one started with the
typical, although typically unspoken, assumption that international
equality was the undisputed norm, no other conclusion would be natu-
ral. Pointing out the obvious ways that state power is vastly dispropor-
tionately distributed appears to be a criticism because we completely
take for granted that the only acceptable arrangement is sovereign
equality. ,
This conclusion does not necessarily follow, however. Once the as-
sumption that only equality is justifiable is examined, it appears that
inequality presents potential for advantage. The single most important
part of this assertion is probably the word "potential," which tends to
be overlooked by those authors who would find advantage in hegem-
ony. My objective is, first, to show that such potential exists, but more
importantly, to make some claims about our obligation to. capture that
potential and to outline the steps that we would have to take to head in
that direction.
The most effective way to ensure order and tranquility is govern-
ance, but all governance requires some unequal distribution of power.
Obviously, police are empowered to do a variety of things, such as
carry certain weapons and detain private individuals, that other indi-
viduals are not. Legislators have law-making powers that ordinary citi-
zens lack. Judges have the power to resolve disputes and to call upon
the state to back those resolutions with force. Although anarchists in-
sist that these advantages can be obtained without a state possessing
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coercive power, few are convinced. Most of us believe that domestic
order is best, or perhaps only, achieved through some form of coercion.
The apparent difference between domestic and international ine-
quality is that the officials of domestic government have some formal
authorization to exercise unequal power. Internationally, there are few
if any formal justifications for the unequal distribution of power that
exists.6 However, because powerful states, and in particular the United
States, are not formally authorized to exercise the power that they pos-
sess does not negate the practical advantages that inequality can pro-
vide. Where no formal authorization exists, one must still ask whether
the world is a better place by virtue of the leadership of a single pow-
erful actor. The answer seems to be that inequality creates the poten-
tial for benefiting the world as a whole.
To offer one example, it seems unlikely that the current regime of
nuclear nonproliferation could function if not for the existence and
support of several powerful nations. It is certainly not egalitarian; nu-
clear "have nots" are to be kept indefinitely in this state, while nuclear
powers are allowed to retain their weapons for the foreseeable future
with only the vaguest of obligations to disarm. Most of us would not
conclude, however, that nuclear equality is a preferable solution, be-
cause allowing every state to develop nuclear weapons would increase
the risk of nuclear terrorism as well as formal nuclear war. The do-
mestic equivalent of nonproliferation would be a country where certain
sorts of weapons are prohibited to private individuals and concentrated
in official hands. Although unequal, this is a tradeoff that many of us
are perfectly happy to make.
The public choice theorists explain the advantages of domination by
a single large actor in terms of collective action theory. Where a public
good-here, stability and norm observance-is to be produced, each
actor in the system has an incentive to free-ride on the compliance of
others; a suboptimal amount of the public good will therefore be pro-
duced. The problem is reduced if there is a single, large actor in the
system who finds it worthwhile to produce the good even if others do
not contribute. A large actor may gain enough advantage from produc-
tion of the good simply by virtue of its size; therefore, the large actor
will let the others free-ride.
For example, certain powerful nations found enough advantage in
reversing Iraq's conquest of Kuwait that they were willing to under-
take the tremendous costs of mounting a military response. 7 Given the
6. One has to state this proposition in terms of the usual case, because there are some bases
for formal inequality; the veto power on the Security Council is the best example.
7. We will return in a moment to the question of how the United States managed to
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costs of such an undertaking, the only nations with sufficient incentive
would be ones that stood to benefit enough to make the costs worth-
while. Only a very large nation would stand to gain enough to take
action by itself; if other smaller nations had to organize to undertake a
military response, they would face severe collective action problems.
Specifically, why should any small nation contribute if it could free-
ride on others' willingness to bear the costs? Absent some scheme of
international taxation to compel contributions, which would make
small state protestations irrelevant, each small state would be tempted
to equivocate strategically and leave the burden to others. This type of
reasoning has supported the international relations analysis known as
"hegemonic stability theory," according to which the presence of a sin-
gle, inordinately powerful actor helps to stabilize international political
processes.
Once power is centralized and stability is achieved, the question of
legitimacy can be addressed. This process of legitimation takes the
form of gradually imposing increasingly greater constraints upon the
most powerful actors in the system. Historical analogies exist in cer-
tain processes of domestic government formation. Most current govern-
ments have descended from regimes that were, to some degree, more
autocratic. If legitimate government consists of centralized authority
that is restrained by principles of democracy and human rights, one
must concede that "centralization" of authority often precedes "re-
straints." The British system of government, for example, developed
from a relatively absolute monarchy to a parliamentary democracy
through the gradual imposition of democratic constraints upon an es-
sentially authoritarian system. Unification and consolidation of power
can be followed by gradual relaxation of autocratic rule.
It is typically impossible to develop overnight and through consent
the strong coercive institutions necessary to force compliance with
norms. The most beautiful and egalitarian system of laws is worth
little unless backed either by some coercive force or by some strongly
held consensus about what should be acceptable behavior. Consensus,
notoriously, takes time to produce. This is especially true of the sort of
deeply held consensus that is required to support a set of norms that
calls on actors to depart from immediate self-interest and to respect the
claims of others with the confidence that one's own claims will be
respected reciprocally. Furthermore, the most straightforward way to
produce consensus about norms is to commit them to an actor powerful
pressure other nations into sharing the costs; at issue now is the fact that the United States had
no assurances at the time that cost-sharing would eventually come about, and thus effectively
took the risk that it would bear the burden singlehandedly. This it was willing to do.
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enough to force, persuade, or cajole the constituent actors in the system
to comply. Democratic legitimacy typically comes afterwards.
Again, the Persian Gulf War provides an illustration because it
shows how dominant powers can be tamed by the practical require-
ments of effective governance. As noted above, according to public
choice theory the largest actors in the system have an incentive to pro-
vide public goods even though doing so may allow smaller actors to
free-ride. Of course, from the large actor's point of view a better solu-
tion is to produce the good and compel the others to contribute. The
United States essentially did this during the Gulf War by diplomati-
cally pressuring other nations into making contributions. However, at-
tempts to share the costs have the long-run consequence of redistrib-
uting the power to make decisions as well. Other states will only
contribute if they are reasonably convinced that what they are contrib-
uting to is also in their interests. A state contemplating unilateral ac-
tion that is to be retroactively funded by other states must always have
in mind the possibility of other state's refusing to contribute.
The same phenomenon could be observed historically when auto-
cratic domestic governments attempted to support activities through
wide-scale contributions. The English monarchs, for example, eventu-
ally found that they could no longer pay the cost of waging war
through their private treasuries. For financial support, they turned to a
broader group that included the nobles and the bourgeoisie. In the
short run, it seemed a good way of financing government activities; in
the long run, it had the consequence of increasing popular control over
the activities in question.
This historical analogy illustrates two things. The first is that cen-
tralization of power does not automatically result in an increase in the
public good. Despite some public choice theorists' enthusiasm for the
role that dominant actors play, centralization may be a necessary con-
dition, but it is not sufficient. Even though the potential for public
order and the general good exists, there is no assurance that the poten-
tial will be captured because a monarch's or dictator's hold on the
reins of government may only facilitate self-dealing. Although public
choice theorists speculate that the existence of a dominant actor creates
the possibility for provision of public goods, there is no guarantee that
the dominant actor will use its power in such a fair-minded way. Orig-
inally, the British monarchy-like the United States until very re-
cently-ignored considerations of the public good, bearing the costs it-
self and waging war if and only if doing so served its private interests.
A second step, some sort of influence by the smaller actors, is needed to
ensure that that potential is actualized. Whether the United States will
make this transition remains to be seen.
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The second point, however, is that even when concentration is em-
ployed for selfish purposes, in the long run such concentration tends to
erode. It is typically easier to 'govern with the consent of the governed,
because consenting individuals are more likely to obey norms and con-
sent ensures a wider basis of financial support. Furthermore, because
it is easier to govern with the consent of the governed, a long-term
tendency for autocratic power to be redistributed in a more egalitarian
manner is created. This reasoning suggests that the best way to pursue
long-range transformation of hegemonic foreign policy is through in-
cremental changes and through the increase in reliance that the domi-
naI;lt power comes to place on weaker states to help in carrying out its
purposes. Over the long term, a dominant power's reliance on world
approval and world financial support can have a significant democra-
tizing effect.
Both points are illustrated by American foreign policy. The first
point is clear; the fact that American concentration creates the poten-
tial for public goods production does not, by itself, guarantee that that
potential will be fulfilled. Although it likes to see itself as taking on the
cost of international goods production single-handedly, the United
States has short-range ways of forcing other states to share the cost of
what we have determined in advance (and according to our own tastes
and values) to be worthwhile public goods. However, in the long run
its tendency to rely on outside funding increases other nations' influ-
ence on American behavior. Furthermore, its desire to achieve world
consensus, by operating through multilateral institutions such as the
United Nations, makes the United States more vulnerable to long-term
international democratization.
This process surely must hold the key to moving world political re-
lations in a more democratic and legitimate direction. This transforma-
tion in the direction of greater dependence on the resources of other
nations and on the popular acceptance of other nations provides for a
gradual taming of American hegemony and a gradual redistribution of
power in a more egalitarian way. It does not seem likely that through
sheer force of will the other nations of the world will be able to con-
vince the United States that it should share power. An immediate and
sudden return to a totally equal distribution of power presents the
problem that no state will be able to enforce international order and
stability. The United Nations is unlikely to develop the sort of enforce-
ment capability that would be necessary to enforce international law
by itself, and no other formal institution of world governance exists
that could perform this function in its place. We have to work with the
concentration of power that currently exists, to appreciate the potential
that it offers for international stability and public order, and to find
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ways to ensure that the coercive potential that exists be exercised in
ways that promote the public good rather than the private interests of
a single nation.
III.
This brings us to the question of how this transformation is to be
brought about, and here, there are two sorts of answers. The first is
fairly obvious from the above discussion. The other actors in the world
community must continue to attempt to tie American power to the
public good. Over time, innumerable small strings can effectively bind
even a powerful nation. If the United States continues to behave as
though multilateral institutions matter, as it did during the Gulf War
and as it has continued to do sporadically since then, they will matter.
Over time, it will become unthinkable that the United States should
act against world public opinion. As to how much time, I would not
venture a guess.
Of course, the responsibility does not lie entirely with the other na-
tions of the world, and this brings us to the second set of responses.
The United States should recognize its role in ensuring international
democratization. To the extent that hierarchy can be justified, it is be-
cause this is the only way to ensure order and stability. If there are
ways of maintaining stability that allow smaller nations to have an
increase in influence over their own destinies, these are paths that the
United States has an obligation to pursue. Gradual relinquishment of
disproportionate power is morally obligatory where it does not
threaten to undermine international governance.
Our present circumstances find us faced with a unique historical
opportunity. During the Cold War, the United States felt itself in di-
rect competition with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was thought
to be more or less an equal competitor, although our perception about
the extent of threat it posed vacillated over time. During some periods
it was thought that military preparedness had slipped, that Soviet sci-
entific expertise outstripped our own, and that communism was mak-
ing gains against us in the Third World. At other times, a greater
sense of confidence prevailed. However, the overall sense was of a
more or less even match. This sense of competition with a roughly
equal competitor amplified the sentiment that "all is fair in love and
war" and that international anarchy justified adoption of ethically
unattractive responses to international threats that could not be safely
managed any other way. The United States could justify its private
actor attitude towards foreign policy.
This sense of the urgency and entitlement of an exclusive focus on
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American national interest has unfortunately persisted, even though
the conditions that made this sense most plausible have largely gone
away. Of course, no one would claim that no threats to American se-
curity have survived the end of the Cold War. However, it trivializes
the extent of American insecurity during some periods of apparent So-
viet ascendancy to say that such conditions continue to exist. To take
one extreme example, nothing resembling the Cuban missile crisis ex-
ists at present day. Although there are threats, there is nothing compa-
rable to the fear of nuclear annihilation that underscored American
willingness to accept the costs and dangers of its own nuclear buildup.
The existence of roughly equal powers, in other words, can make what
may at first seem paranoid behavior more plausible.
Under current circumstances, however, behavior that might have
seemed reasonable at the height of the Cold War would seem truly
paranoic. Although there are threats, they are threats that tend to eat
away at American interests fairly slowly; they are threats like the drug
trade, terrorism by militant groups, and the flow of illegal immigra-
tion. These threats are not so consummately menacing that they au-
thorize violations of deeply held moral principles to forestall them. The
bona fide sense of anarchy that pervaded Cold War days made extreme
measures more respectable. The far greater level of security we enjoy
today gives us more moral room for maneuvering, a freedom of action
to comply with basic decency and to turn our back on fears that in a
dog-eat-dog world, the ends must surely sometimes justify the means.
Just as the end of the Cold War gave us room to act consistently
with our basic moral principles, it also gave us greater responsibility.
Take, for example, the case of aid to developing nations. It might have
been an excuse at one time that a nation to which we refused assis-
tance had someplace else to look-specifically, the Soviet Union. Or,
take the case of our economic embargo of Cuba. When Cubans had
another source of aid and trade, our efforts to cut them off were more
understandable. The point is that the United States is now in some-
thing of a monopoly position. Some of our representatives in Washing-
ton seem to take this as an invitation to tighten the noose further. It
should be taken as the opposite, however. The fact that the United
States is sometimes the only game in town gives rise to responsibilities
that did not previously exist.
International law is modelled on an assumption of formal juridical
equality, and this unrealistic assumption has been G.llowed to condition
our approach to international responsibility. If we are merely one
equal nation among many, we have no greater responsibility to "police
the world," to feed the hungry, or to unilaterally divest ourselves of
nuclear weapons than any other. If we are merely equal, it is under-
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standable that we feel trapped in an unwelcome security dilemma and
find it necessary to conserve our resources for the support of nations
that align with us and are our friends when world political disputes
arise. But, to the extent that the United States has become preeminent,
the security dilemma is unrealistic and our aid policies are inhumane.
We have responsibilities to the world that arise out of our new position
in a recently reshaped global hierarchy.
To return to the metaphor of public citizen, it is clear that masquer-
ading as just another private actor in the world community is no longer
decent and tolerable. Not only is the opportunity for global leadership
available, so is the obligation. Americans, perhaps, find it ironic that
nations that were once its strongest critics, primarily on the grounds
that America intervened too readily, are now decrying its unwilling-
ness to intervene. In particular, some smaller, weaker countries of the
South claim that we should take a more activist role in civil wars and
regional conflicts in that area. The ground beneath us has shifted, so
that intervention, which was formerly a dirty word, is now sometimes
envisioned as a benefit. Considering the reconfiguring of international
politics, however, we should drop this sense of puzzlement and try to
understand what other nations want from us and how much of what
they want is actually deserved.
To be a public citizen, the United States should recognize the ambi-
guities that always attach to the fulfillment of a dual role. Like any
public figure in domestic politics, a public citizen in international polit-
ics is subject to superficially conflicting responsibilities. In domestic
politics, a public citizen is simultaneously a shaper and implementer of
the law and also a subject of the law like any other citizen. The fact
that someone fills a position of political and social responsibility,
whether as an elected official, a judge, a prominent member of the
media, or simply a leading commercial figure, does not suggest that he
or she is not in many other respects an equal of the ordinary citizen or
above the laws that apply to others. The greater power that goes with
this public stature carries with it greater moral responsibility. The
United States cannot simply pick up its role as public figure when it
chooses to and put it down when the role is costly or inconvenient.
Until it chooses to relinquish its special empowerments as the world's
predominant public citizen, it has responsibilities to act to fill the as-
pects of that role that do ~ot follow from self-interest.
Into what does all of this translate? Without going into specific pre-
scriptions here, it is possible to spell out general outlines. These are
more in the way of attitudinal changes than specific policies to adopt.
This is not to say that attitude will be enough. Attitude is clearly not
enough, but in the space that remains, I would rather state a general
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philosophy of outlook than address the particular problems that we
face in 1995. I offer three recommendations: that we be increasingly
self-critical, increasingly informed, and increasingly evenhanded.
Self-Criticism
American ideals, as we envision them abstractly, are not really so
bad, but we tend to be seriously derelict in the ways that we apply
them. I offer three examples. The first concerns American economic
assistance to the rest of the world. Polls consistently suggest that Amer-
icans overestimate the amount that this country provides to other na-
tions in the form of economic aid. Furthermore, when asked to state
how much the United States should offer other countries, Americans
typically name a figure that is considerably larger than the amount of
aid that is currently given. Although we tend to think of ourselves as a
generous and caring nation, the percentage of our economic wealth
that we contribute to other nations' economic development is in actual-
ity far lower than many other nations' contributions. Furthermore,
much of our foreign aid budget is directed at a few countries that are
of strategic or domestic political interest to Americans, rather than be-
ing targeted at those countries that could best employ development
assistance.
The second example concerns human rights. Again, we envision
ourselves as a beacon to the world. In many respects Americans are in
fact quite fortunate; there is no point being unduly negative about the
political system we enjoy. However, it is also true that the United
States has almost uniformly declined to enter into human rights agree-
ments and where it has signed, it has added reservations that make it
highly unlikely that we will ever have to change domestic practices.
Indeed, it is hard to think of a single alteration that the United States
has made in domestic practices in response to international conceptions
of human rights. Is it really so likely that we got the answer perfect
the first time around on our own and that we have nothing to learn
from the experience of the world community? Would such a conclusion
square with our perception that we are the most advanced country in
the world from the point of view of human rights?
Third, there is the oscillation that has formed the principal focus of
this article. We are obviously not looking critically at our own behav-
ior when we vacillate between accepting a leadership role when it suits
our interests and retreating into private concerns when leadership
seems to be too onerous. It is not asking too much of the American
people that they compare their current attitudes to their attitudes two
or three years ago. If a positive role in the "new world order" was a
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good idea then, it does not cease to be a good thing just because our
role cannot be played for free. It is the responsibility of our political
leaders and other shapers of public opinion to address this problem.
Some of them do so already, but not as many as would be necessary to
make the point.
Information
It is virtually a cliche that Americans are not well informed about
world politics. Our children do not learn enough geography or world
history in school, and American adults pay little attention to world
affairs. Someone I know once complained, "Why do the newspapers
keep having stories about Yugoslavia? Aren't there enough problems
here in the United States to write about?" I have the opposite reaction.
It is very difficult to keep abreast of the day-to-day news of any part of
the world that is not enjoying the media attention that comes from
being in a state of crisis.
This is not the whole of the problem, however. Although the Ameri-
can public may know little about events in other parts of the world,
are we entirely confident that our policy makers are doing much bet-
ter? Certainly our congressional representatives have much better ac-
cess to information than we do; as in many other areas of policy mak-
ing, they are probably drowning in information. However, there is a
question of the quality of information-perhaps, better put, a question
of the way that information is focused-that accompanies the question
of quantity. This can be seen by contrasting the way we treat the as-
sessment of the impact that our actions have on foreign nations with
the way that we treat the assessment of the impact that our actions
have on our environment.
It was not too many years ago that we were entirely haphazard in
the way that we investigated the effect of governmental actions on the
quality of the environment. This is not to say that absolutely no atten-
tion was paid to environmental matters or that there was no good way
for our decision-makers to get access to the information that they de-
cided that they needed. Rather, the point is that they were not required
systematically to assess the environmental impact of every action as a
routine matter. To remedy this situation, we passed a law requiring
that certain sorts of governmental actions had to be preceded by envi-
ronmental .impact statements. The point was that environmental as-
sessment had to be a systematic part of every decision that was made
because otherwise there was no guarantee that environmental quality
would be taken into account. Furthermore, there were procedural re-
quirements about permitting public input and public review of the re-
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suIting assessment. If these requirements were not met, judicial chal-
lenge was available.
Before the reader shrinks in horror, I should clarify that my recom-
mendation is not that we extend a literally identical req~irement to
foreign policy decision-making. The costs of the information bureau-
cracy are great, and although I am in favor of requiring environmental
impact statements, I would certainly recognize that this precise analog
mayor may not be desirable in international decision-making. The
contrast is offered more as a starting point for discussion. What would
it be like if every time that one of our decision-makers considered tak-
ing action that would affect people in other countries, it was necessary
first to make a systematic assessment of the likely effect that that action
would have?
It is easy to think of areas where including such a requirement
would make a noticeable difference in government decision-making:
trade policy, the closing of our markets to certain sorts of imports, for
example; financial policy, the raising and lowering of interest rates in
ways that would affect the international flows of capital; and immigra-
tion policy, the institution of a lottery that draws the most educated
and productive members of a foreign country to the United States.
These are just three examples that immediately come to mind. It is not
that extraterritorial consequeryces are never taken into account when
foreign policy decisions are made. It is just that it would be desirable if
an obligation to systematically consider all of the ramifications that our
actions have on other nations was recognized.
There seems to be something ironic about the fact that we have
come to recognize that the impact of our actions on our environment
must be taken seriously, but that we have never explicitly dealt with
what is, in my mind, an equally strong case for considering the impact
of our actions on the citizens of other nations.8 Of course, some of our
concern for the environment is just self-interest; not all supporters of
environmental legislation are bird watchers, hikers, or other nature
lovers. Some simply realized that we were going to choke in our own
waste if we did not start to do something different. The same could be
said about foreign policy. Other countries are, after all, our world en-
vironment. When we are inattentive to the effect of our actions on
Third World poverty or political instability in neighboring countries,
we are just as surely poisoning our environment as if we chose fo ig-
8. See Edward N. Luttwak, If Bosnians Were Dolphins . .. ; Armed Assistance to Bosnia-
Herzegovina, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1993, at 27 (noting that, had the Bosnian Muslims been
bottle-nosed dolphins, the world would have been far less willing to allow the Serbs and Croats
to slaughter them by tens of thousands).
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nore the toxic chemicals being poured into our rivers. Can it really be
said that we are entitled to care more about snail darters than the
people of Bolivia?
Perhaps the reason that this contrast seems a bit odd is that we ex-
pect the people of Bolivia to be able to take care of themselves. They
have an ambassador in Washington D.C.; they can protest with the
United Nations; they can organize with other nations to attempt to
block our actions. In this respect, the people of other nations are cer-
tainly far removed from snail darters. However, there are two re-
sponses to this undeniable objection. The first is, obviously, that we
should not overstate the power of Bolivians to fight back. This brings
us back to the special responsibilities that the United States has by
virtue of its superpower status. We have to be forthright about the fact
that while other nations have the chance in theory to resist, sometimes
this resistance is effective and sometimes it is doomed from the start. In
particular, protests from certain nations-Israel and Ireland come to
mind-are likely to resonate more directly with domestic politics and,
thus, have a greater impact than protests from others.
A second point gets back to the way that we pay attention to the
protests that are made. We cannot assume that the ambassadors and
politicians who react to the United States's actions will be able to pre-
sent the entire story. I do not mean merely to raise the common-place
observation that these ambassadors and politicians are not necessarily
representative. In some cases they are, although in these cases they are
not-just as some domestic American politicians are more responsive to
popular wishes than others. The point is, instead, that we are not enti-
tled to simply listen to a country's representatives and then rest easy in
the assumption that if they have not presented an accurate and forceful
case, they have only themselves to blame. We tend to see foreign policy
as something like the legal ethics of the adversary system. If the client
loses, the reason is that the lawyer is inadequate and the client and the
lawyer can only blame themselves.
But if what we genuinely care about is the impact that our actions
have in other nations, rather than finding excuses for our own igno-
rance, we will accept some of the responsibility for determining what
that impact is likely to be. We will recognize that if some country lacks
political clout or the financial resources to mount a politically sophisti-
cated lobbying campaign, it falls to us to find out what we can do
about the consequences. I am suggesting that our attitude should be
more like that of the judge in the continental legal systems, referred to,
perhaps unfortunately, as "inquisitorial" rather than "adversarial."
The judge in the continental legal system accepts some of the responsi-
bility to make the case turn out right, even when that means supple-
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menting the questioning and presentation of evidence by the parties'
chosen counsel. What I am suggesting is that we should act as though
we genuinely cared about what we are doing to people outside our
borders.
Evenhandedness
The final quality that it would be highly advantageous for a public
spirited citizen of the world community to possess is increased even-
handedness. First, note that evenhandedness is a quality that is partic-
ularly appropriate for those who play a public role. Although we do
not insist that private citizens treat each other as exactly equal-as a
private citizen, I am entitled to favor my friends or relatives in many
respects-favoritism by those in public roles has rather different moral
overtones. To make a legal analogy, one would say that discrimination
"under color of state law" is a far more serious matter than discrimi-
nation by private individuals.
Evenhandedness sounds as though our nation must be no more in-
clined to favor its own interests than the interests of other nations, and
no more inclined to favor the interests of its allies than the interests of
its enemies. In fact, it need not always mean exactly that. Keep in
mind the grounds that were just offered for requiring evenhandedness.
They had to do with the public role that the United States is currently
filling. The reason that the United States can sometimes justify its fill-
ing of this role is the public advantages to the global community of
having public order.
This rationale suggests that evenhandedness must be consistent with
the United States's public role and the logic that underlies it. In partic-
ular, power to preserve the public order is a precious resource that
should be conserved. This means two things. First, it means that the
United States is not required to diffuse its power so that it is no longer
capable of acting as a stabilizing force. To carry forward the "police-
man" metaphor, we do not require that police disarm themselves in the
name of equality. Second, and conversely, whatever inequalities are
tolerated must be justifiable in terms of the public goods that they pro-
duce. Perpetuation of the United States's power is not an end in itself.
To the contrary, it can be at most a means to the desired end of world
stability.
Consider the case of nuclear weapons, an example that this article
raised earlier. The reason that it is permissible to have a two tiered
regime in which some nations are part of a nuclear club and others are
not is purely and simply the good of the group as a whole. The advan-
tage to all of discouraging enlargement of the nuclear club are obvious;
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furthermore, these advantages are shared widely by the world commu-
nity and do not accrue solely to those nations that possess the bomb.
Yet, the pressures on any particular nation to develop nuclear weapons
are severe if hostile nations in the vicinity are doing likewise. Public
choice logic suggests, overwhelmingly, that inequality in this situation
will serve the public good. The remaining question is how best to
make this inequality serve the needs of those nations that voluntarily
give up aspirations to nuclear weapons.
"Evenhandedness" means pursuing the good of the community as a
whole and distributing the gains achieved this way as evenly as possi-
ble. It does not mean cutting off one's nose to spite one's face, although
the ideal of equality sometimes seems to suggest that we are better off
equally impoverished than unequally comfortable. So understood,
evenhandedness does not present a threat to any legitimate American
interest. It simply means that consistent with its role as public citizen,
the United States is obligated to consider seriously the impact on
others.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the present political climate, talk about American responsibility is
no doubt whistling in the wind. There is no reason to think that this is
the direction that American political opinion will be moving towards.
This is unfortunate from a long-term perspective. I am convinced that
in the long run, American interest and American responsibility will
coincide. In the long run, it will serve American interests that interna-
tional stability and order was promoted, and that American leadership
in doing so was recognized.
In the short run, though, the costs are everything. What matters
most is the financial costs and the risks to American lives, coupled with
the reasonable fear that the measures under consideration may not
turn out to be effective. We were lucky in the Persian Gulf War in
that few American lives were lost and most of our objectives were ac-
complished. The same result is far less likely in situations such as Bos-
nia; although we should keep in mind that before we acted in the Per-
sian Gulf, success was not assured.
We are not doing future Americans any favors if we fail to take
advantage of this opportunity to work with other nations to advance
world order. We are also not doing other nations a favor if we hide
behind false modesty, failing to become involved because "it is not our
responsibility." This is false modesty because the United States has
never shown disinclination to become involved when it felt its interests
were at stake, and the rest of the world is well aware of this fact. It is
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not a favor because where other nations have taken the unusual step of
actually inviting United States's intervention, deference to the sover-
eignty of other nations is not an adequate reason for our failure to
respond.
If we were truly to resort to isolationism, we would stop our efforts
to affect events in other countries. We would stop our pressure on Co-
lombia to prohibit drug trafficking; we would stop our efforts to open
Japanese economic markets; we would put an end to American pres-
sure regarding human rights abuses in Chechnya, Turkey, and China;
and we would terminate our pressure on other nations to save the
whales, to save the seals, and to save the rhinos. We do not, because
we recognize that what goes on in other nations has an impact on what
happens here at home and that gives us some claim to take an interest
in events that happen there.
By the same token, however, what happens here has implications for
the citizens of other nations. The decisions that we make affect the
lives of people everywhere around the globe. Indeed, if extraterritorial
effects were taken as the indicator of a right to be involved, citizens of
other nations would have a much greater claim to influence decisions
made in the United States than people here have rights to influence
decisions made in other nations. The consequences of the things this
nation does are asymmetrical; we affect more greatly other states' af-
fairs than other states' affairs impact us. Unfortunately, we tend to see
the latter rather than the former.
There may be reasons to tolerate the asymmetric nature of world
relations. It may be unavoidable given the advantages that leadership
potentially creates. To find oneself in the position of world leadership,
however, does not authorize diverting leadership capacities to a purely
private advantage. The benefits of leadership are a public good, to be
distributed as widely as possible. Ignoring this responsibility is to our
long-run detriment, to the detriment of our children, to the detriment
of the other nations' children, and to the detriment of the world as
well.
